Category Archives: Islamists

Canting humbugs in their hundreds of thousands

Hard feelings in the East Indies

The sentencing of the Christian governor of Jakarta to two years’ imprisonment for blasphemy might, writes Dalrymple,

seem like a throwback to medieval intolerance,

but, he says,

it is more than that. It is a reminder that the suppression of the freedom of others is more fun than the exercise of freedom.

The Muslim masses who demanded the prosecution of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama

enjoyed their virtuous anger,

which is

among the pleasures that their religion does not deny them.

Islamic humbug

Dalrymple notes that although intellectually primitive, the condemnation and sentencing of Ahok, as he is known,

was in one respect modern. One of the judges said that punishment was justified because the governor had hurt the feelings of Muslims—which must have been as delicate as those of Western students who need safe spaces and teddy-bears to hug if they hear something that contradicts their preconceptions.

The desire not to have one’s feelings hurt

has been erected into a right increasingly enforceable at law. Not everyone’s feelings are treated with the solicitude that we show a nice fluffy colourful species of animal that is on the verge of extinction. But treating people’s feelings with this solicitude tends not only to preserve them but to cause them to flourish.

Dalrymple avers that

we have a duty to control our indignation, for most of the time it will be liberally admixed with humbug.

He does not expect his message to be heard in Jakarta,

to judge from the pictures of those hundreds of thousands of canting humbugs in the city’s streets.

Warped values of certain Western Muslims

Screen Shot 2016-08-23 at 08.58.13The young Islamists of western Europe, writes Dalrymple,

  • resent strongly but incoherently
  • blame their conduct on others
  • use their frustrations to justify outrageous and vicious acts
  • pity themselves to the exclusion of all others
  • use their minds as echo chambers for the wrongs, real or imagined, that they have suffered
  • have a grossly inflated sense of their importance
  • have an ideology at hand to make them dangerous on a big scale

Instant access to the 72 houris in heaven

Screen Shot 2016-08-04 at 09.31.28Inside the minds of guilty debauched lapsed Moslems

Writing of the intellectual nullity of the ideas behind Moslem terror attacks, Dalrymple observes that

it is as if a whole society is being held to ransom by its worst and most stupid members. This is in contrast to the intelligence that is expended on trying to understand the stupid. The stupid are the stoat and the intelligent are the rabbit.

He notes that a number of the Moslem terrorists

indulge in somewhat crude debauchery before suddenly turning puritanically pious and killing others in the certainty that they themselves will be killed.

According to the historian of philosophy Rémi Brague, the debauched Moslems

still have some attachment to Islam in their debauched phase, rather as a lapsed Catholic. They feel subliminally that what they are doing is wrong from the Islamic standpoint, and some of them are suddenly overwhelmed by guilt.

But a slow process of repentance is not for them.

It would involve a life without the pleasures that are so important to them. By killing others and being killed in the process, they are getting their repentance over in one fell swoop. They will not have to face a long life of self-denial, but accede at once to the heavenly virgins. Heaven is debauchery without the guilt.

1

Islam: global force for a new totalitarianism

Emblem of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood

Emblem of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Dalrymple wonders whether Islam is

an intrinsically totalitarian religion.

It is worth remembering, he says,

how few of us gave any attention to it as a serious political force only twenty years ago.

He suspects that

the downfall of the Soviet Union and the consequent destruction of the possibility of socialistic nationalism as a means for poor or desperate countries (poverty and desperation not being the same thing) to escape their predicament, stimulated the rise of Islam to the position of latest utopian pretender.

There had been Islamists before the downfall of the Soviet Union,

but they offered only one bogus solution among other bogus solutions. After the downfall, Islam had the field to itself, apart from liberal democracy, which is inherently messy and unsatisfying for the lazy and impatient.

Screen Shot 2016-07-29 at 08.03.02Islamism, Dalrymple points out,

is a real threat, made far worse by the cowardly response to it by most western governments, including that of the United States.

Take the Danish cartoon crisis, which, Dalrymple notes, was highly

significant for our civilisation and way of life in the long run. There the British and American governments failed the test miserably; de facto, they gave aid and succour to the Islamists.

As for the neo-atheists, they are right to see the threat of theocracy in Islamism, but

in attacking all religion, they are like the French government which banned not only the wearing of the headscarf in schools, but the wearing of all religious insignia, despite the fact that wearing a Star of David or a crucifix has and had a completely different social signification from wearing a headscarf. In the name of non-discrimination, the French government failed to discriminate properly: and proper discrimination is practically the whole business of life. If there were large numbers of Christians or Jews who were in favour of establishing a theocracy in France, who had a recent record of terrorism, and who terrorised each other into the wearing of crucifixes and Stars of David, then the banning of those insignia would have been justified too.

Screen Shot 2016-07-29 at 08.06.20The wearing of the headscarf should be permitted again

when Islam has become merely one personal confession among others, without the political significance that it has now.

In attacking all religion so indiscriminately, the atheist authors are

strengthening the hand of the Islamists. In arguing that for parents to bring up a child in any religious tradition, even the mildest of Anglicanism, is to abuse a child, with the corollary that the law should forbid it, they are giving ammunition to the Islamists, who will be able with justice to say to their fellow-religionists, ‘See, it is all or nothing. If you give the secularists an inch, they will take a mile. No compromise with secularism is possible, therefore; cleave unto us.’

To suggest

that all forms of religion are equal, that they are all murderous and dangerous, is not to serve the cause of freedom and tolerance. It is to play into the hands of the very people we should most detest; it is to hand them the rhetorical tools with which they can tell the gullible that our freedoms are not genuine and that our tolerance is a masquerade. It is to do what I should previously have thought was impossible, namely in this respect to put them in the right.

Barbarity in the name of righteousness

Screen Shot 2016-07-26 at 22.02.50No need to emphasise, writes Dalrymple,

the terrifying demonstration effect

of what is done to supposed infidels

by people to whom plenty of bullets are available as an alternative, swifter, and more certain method of procuring death.

We conclude, as we are intended to conclude, that

these are fierce and ruthless people whose belief in their desert-tribal righteousness is unshakeable.

To commit barbarity in the name of righteousness is to some men

one of the greatest joys. And not just to Islamists, though at the moment it is they alone who have the courage of their barbarity, and rejoice publicly in it.

Cruelty

is never worse than when higher authority is invoked not merely to justify it, but to demand it.

From strumming guitars to decapitation in three months

Screen Shot 2016-07-06 at 08.49.34Dalrymple notes that in the Dhaka cafe terror attack, the six Islamist killers

were not downtrodden, like so many of their countrymen. They were scions of the small, rich, and educated local élite. They were privileged as only the rich in poor countries can be privileged.

Vice

knows no class barriers and education is often more an aid than a hindrance to evil committed in the name of ideology.

Screen Shot 2016-07-06 at 08.50.21The Soviets recruited their useful idiots in the West

not from the supposedly ignorant proletariat but from the ranks of the educated.

But even such pitiless people as the Soviets

did not expect their recruits personally to hack people to death if they could not recite the Communist Manifesto—and go straight to heaven as a result.

1Some of the Bangladeshi perpetrators

fanaticised themselves only recently. The parents found it difficult to believe that their sons—previously polite and without apparent problems, indeed with ‘humanitarian’ sentiments of the modern kind—should have suddenly turned so psychopathically brutal.

The killers

could not have expected anything but a smooth passage through life. Lack of prospects was certainly not what impelled them.

After the downfall of Communism, Islamism

is the only ideology that supposedly answers all life’s questions and can appeal to the adolescent search for certainty about what life is for. It appeals only to born Muslims and a small number of converts. It has none of the cross-cultural appeal that Communism did. But why person x rather than person y falls for it—that is a question that can never be fully answered.

Candles, my dear, candles. Teddy-bears are infra dig

Screen Shot 2016-06-18 at 21.05.48As soon as Dalrymple heard of the Orlando nightclub shooting and of the Jo Cox murder,

I knew that within a few hours the candles would be out.

Sure enough,

like the ants that appear on my kitchen surface when there is something sweet left about, lit candles in little glasses appeared. Where do they come from, these candles, and where are they hiding before a massacre, an assassination or a disaster?

Screen Shot 2016-06-18 at 21.06.57Dalrymple thinks it likely

that all those who light candles and stand or sit looking sad but beatific and virtuous behind or beside them after a terrible event are not religious. They would not be seen dead lighting a candle in a church. But they are probably the kind of people who say they are ‘spiritual but not religious’, that is to say who indulge in all kinds of spiritual kitsch, for instance

  • reiki therapy
  • healing chakras of the earth
  • wind chimes
  • strategically-placed crystals

Screen Shot 2016-06-18 at 21.11.24What, he asks, is the message?

That they are opposed to massacre or assassination and regret disaster? Does this have to be expressed? Perhaps they are trying to recapture a belief in the transcendent whose very existence they doubt or, in other circumstances, vehemently deny.

Dalrymple says that candles

are a couple of rungs up the spiritual ladder from teddy-bears, the intermediate rung on the ladder being bouquets in cellophane piled high at or near the site of death. The black armband and the mourning dress have been replaced by the teddy-bear, the unwrapped bouquet and the candle in its little glass.

Screen Shot 2016-06-18 at 21.14.01Candles are also

a couple of rungs up the social ladder; the lighters of candles would probably regard teddy-bears as infra dig.

Dalrymple notes that the candles and teddy-bears

must be very comforting for Islamists. When they see them, they must think, ‘These are weak and feeble people, easily intimidated and eminently destructible.

Screen Shot 2016-06-18 at 21.15.38 Screen Shot 2016-06-18 at 21.18.09 Screen Shot 2016-06-18 at 21.19.43 Screen Shot 2016-06-18 at 21.16.25

How penological frivolity spurs terrorism

Screen Shot 2016-04-19 at 13.02.33Dalrymple writes of one of the Belgian bombers:

Before he turned murderously religious, he had been a bank robber. He fired a Kalashnikov at the police when they interrupted him in an attempted robbery, for which crime, or combination of crimes, he received a sentence of nine years’ imprisonment. Of those nine years he served only four, being conditionally discharged. The principal condition was that he had to attend a probation office once a month: about as much use, one might have supposed, as an igloo in the tropics.

No doubt

he underwent various assessments before release establishing his low risk of re-offending; he probably also said before his release that he now realised that shooting policemen with Kalashnikovs was wrong, that he was sorry for it, etc.

One of the causes, then, of terrorism in Europe is, says Dalrymple,

penological frivolity. A 40-year sentence would have been more appropriate.

Penology

is increasingly opposed to the rule of law: it favours the arbitrary and the speculative over the predictable and the certain.

苍白无力的欧洲普世主义

Screen Shot 2016-01-10 at 20.21.41Dalrymple writes:

By now the story of Omar Ismail Mostefai, the first of the perpetrators of the Paris attacks to be named, is depressingly familiar. One could almost have written his biography before knowing anything about him. A petty criminal of Algerian parentage from what all the world now calls the banlieue, he was sustained largely by the social security system, an erstwhile fan of rap music, and a votary of what might be called the continuation of criminality by other means, which is to say Islamism and the grandiose purpose in life that it gives to its adherents. For feeble minds, the extremity of the consequences for self and others serves as some kind of guarantee that their cause is just.

到今天,巴黎袭击事件中第一个确定姓名的案犯Omar Ismail Mostefai的故事已经家喻户晓了。即使对他完全不了解,人们也能凭猜测为他写出一本传记。一个小混混,有着阿尔及利亚血统,成长于今天被世人称为 “暴力街区”的市郊,主要依靠社保体系生活,曾经是饶舌音乐的爱好者,热诚地致力于伊斯兰教和它给予信徒们的宏伟人生目标——或者,从另一种意义上也可以 说,是持续犯罪。对那些意志薄弱的人来说,最终将自己和他人带向死亡,也有着某种正当理由。

Nor was the connection to Molenbeek, a neighbourhood in Brussels where at least three of the terrorists lived, much of a surprise to anyone. Brussels—the “capital of Europe,” be it remembered—is slightly more than a quarter Muslim, and nearly 100 percent of Molenbeek’s residents are Muslims of North African background. When a few years ago I was shown around the place, my acquaintances told me it was virtually extraterritorial as far as the Belgian state was concerned—apart from the collection of social security, of course.

而他与莫伦贝克区(至少三名参与巴黎恐袭的恐怖分子都来自这里)之间的联系也丝毫不会让人感到惊奇。布鲁塞尔——人们记忆中的“欧洲之都”——的穆 斯林人口占比略高于四分之一,而几乎所有的莫伦贝克区居民都是北非裔穆斯林。几年前一些熟人带着我在那里参观的时候,他们告诉我,对比利时政府来说,这个 区域几乎就是“免受司法管辖的治外之地”——当然,除了它还享受着这个国家的社保体系之外。

All the women wore headscarves, and the young men dressed like American rap music fans. The police rarely entered and were far more concerned not to offend Muslim sensibilities—for example, by not being seen to eat during Ramadan—than to find or capture the miscreants who made the area so dangerously crime-ridden. Businesses there (so my guides told me) paid no taxes but were not investigated for evasion by the tax authorities: it was the tax authorities who did the evading.

那里所有的女人都戴着头巾,而年轻男人都穿得像是美国饶舌音乐的狂热粉丝。警察很少进入这个区域,相比追踪和抓捕那些将这里变成一个犯罪猖獗之地的 恶棍,他们更关心的是千万不要触碰到穆斯林的敏感之处——例如,不要在斋月期间被穆斯林看到在白天吃东西。在那里做各种生意(我的导游告诉我)都不交税, 而且也不会受到税务局的调查:相反,税务局只要一听这个地方就会躲得远远的。

Everyone knew Islamist preaching and plotting were rife in Molenbeek, but nothing was done to stop it, in order to keep the tense and fragile peace going as long as possible. Sympathy for terrorism was the norm—or, it would be more correct to say, that no one dared publicly voice opposition to it.

所有人都知道,莫伦贝克区伊斯兰极端分子的宣传策划工作十分猖獗,却没有任何加以阻止的努力,而这只是为了将现有的脆弱和平状态维持得尽量久一些。对恐怖主义的同情成为常态——或者更准确的说,没有谁敢于公开反对。

If my informants were right, this was the perfect place for psychopaths with an illusion of purpose to flourish and make plans undisturbed by the authorities, while being supported by the welfare state. Events since have demonstrated that they did not exaggerate (as, to my regret, I rather suspected at the time that they did, for alarm is so often disproportionate to the reality that gives rise to it).

如果告诉我这些的人是对的,那么对于那些抱有疯狂幻想并且希望在不受当局干扰的状态下筹划自己行动的疯子们而言,这里就是人间天堂,与此同时,他们 还能够享受福利国家的支持。之后发生的事件已经证明了他们并没有夸大其词(而令我后悔的是,当时他们提醒我时,我也对他们的看法表示怀疑,相比警告成真后 人们所面对的残酷现实,之前的警告声总是显得微不足道)。

Recall that the terrorists who were disarmed on the train from Amsterdam to Paris in August came from Molenbeek, as did the man who killed four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in 2014. More volunteers to fight for ISIS have come from Molenbeek than anywhere else in Europe.

回想一下,今年8月那帮在阿姆斯特丹开往巴黎的火车上被人们提前发现并解除了武装的恐怖分子就来自于莫伦贝克区,而那个2014年在布鲁塞尔的犹太人博物馆里杀害了4个人的凶手也同样来自那里。莫伦贝克区为ISIS提供了比全欧洲任何其它地方都要多的志愿战士。

The Belgian Prime Minister, Charles Michel, has now virtually admitted that the area was extraterritorial to Belgium, and out of all control. The time had come “to focus more on repression,” he said. But whether the determination or sufficient political unity necessary to carry it out will last is doubtful. Repression requires discrimination; we live in a regime in which murderers may come and go, but social security goes on forever.

现在,比利时首相米歇尔实际上已经承认该区域已成比利时的“治外之地”,并且已经完全失去了控制。他说,现在应该“把更多的注意力集中在压制上”。 但这种决心是否能得以坚持,或者,为实现这一目标所必须的足够的政治团结能够得以坚持,是值得怀疑的。压制就意味着区别对待,但在我们如今生活的这个社会 制度下,杀人犯来来去去,而社会保障则永不中断。

Do we have the stomach to tar many people with the same brush? That we now know that terrorists among the Syrian refugees have entered Europe, which was precisely the objection of those opposed to accepting them (who were vilified by immigration-liberals for their moral obtuseness or nastiness, and have been proven right, which is even more unforgivable), now raises the disturbing question: How many innocent people should Europe accept for one suicide bomber?

但我们要不要一竿子打倒一船人呢?现在我们已经知道,有些恐怖分子藏在叙利亚难民队伍里混入了欧洲,这正是之前那些反对接纳叙利亚难民入欧的人们所 提出的拒绝理由(为了诋毁他们,那些移民自由派们给他们扣上了“道德迟钝”或“道德败坏”之类的帽子,但最终事实证明他们的担忧是对的,这就让我们所犯下 的错误变得更加不可原谅),而现状又给我们提出了一个令人困扰的问题:为了一个自杀式炸弹袭击者欧洲要接纳多少无辜的难民?

A striking thing about the immigration debate before the massacres of November 13 was the almost complete absence of references, at least by the “respectable” politicians, to the national interest of the various countries. The debate was couched in Kantian moral terms. Sweden, for example, which has no imperative to take refugees other than moral grandiosity and its desire to feel itself virtuous, has had a hard enough time integrating the immigrants it has already taken; their entry has made that country one with nearly the highest crime rate in Western Europe. Current family re-unification laws in Europe mean that the numbers any country agrees to take will soon be expanded.

11月13日的巴黎大屠杀发生之前,在有关移民政策的辩论中令人吃惊的一点是,几乎完全没有人——至少那些“令人尊敬的”政客们中没有人——提及各 国的国家利益。这场辩论是以一种康德式道德辩论的方式进行的。举例来说,除了道德上华而不实的崇高感以及让自己觉得高尚之外,瑞典并没有任何必要去接收难 民,整合已接收的难民也让其已经历了一段非常困难的时期;这些难民进入之后,几乎把瑞典变成了整个西欧犯罪率最高的国家。而当前欧洲有关家庭重聚的法律则 意味着,很快每个国家都将同意接收数量更多的难民。

There is a real moral dilemma, of course. Recently in Bodrum, on the Aegean coast of Turkey, I was approached by a family of four Syrian refugees begging for alms. The father of the family showed me his Syrian passport (precisely of the kind so easily forged by the terrorists), but all I could see was his wife and two small children who were obviously bereft of support and who would obviously suffer without charity. That day, 22 refugees were reported drowned as they tried to reach Turkey by boat, an occurrence so regular that it was not reported in the Western press. No one undertakes such a journey lightly: only safety or an egocentric thirst for “martyrdom” could impel him.

显然,这里有个道德困境。最近在土耳其爱琴海沿岸城市博德鲁姆,一个叙利亚难民的四口之家走近我,希望我能施舍给他们些什么。这家的父亲给我看了他 的叙利亚护照(正是那种恐怖分子非常容易伪造的护照),但我所看到的只是他妻子和两个年幼的孩子所表现出的无助,如果得不到施舍,他们显然会吃很多苦。在 同一天,当地新闻报道了22名难民在乘船试图前往土耳其的途中溺水身亡的消息,而由于这类事情发生得如此频繁,西方媒体甚至都没有报道这条消息。没有人会 轻易选择踏上这样一段旅途:只有对安全的强烈渴求或是个人主义的“殉道”热望才能让人踏上这条路。

Europe has nothing equivalent to national interest, and if it did, it would have no way of acting on it. A kind of bloodless universalism has rushed in to fill the vacuum, whose consequences are now visible to all. The first thing President Hollande tried to do after the attacks was close the borders; he now talks (understandably, of course) of national security. He talks also of defeating ISIS militarily, but France, along with all of the other European countries, has run down its armed forces in the name of the social security that paid for at least some of the terrorists.

欧洲没有国家利益之类的东西,即使有,也不存在以之为名做些什么的政治途径。于是一种苍白无力的普世主义便趁虚而入填补了这一空白,其后果已经呈现 在了每个人面前。巴黎恐怖袭击发生后,奥朗德总统试图做的第一件事就是关闭边境;他现在开始谈论国家安全了(当然,这可以理解)。他同样开始谈论军事打击 ISIS,然而法国和其它的欧洲国家一样,已经以社保资金不足为由削减了自己武装力量,而这些钱中至少有一部分落入了恐怖分子的口袋。

Just because Europe’s weakness is clear doesn’t mean that our heads are clear. Three days after the attacks, the most influential newspaper in Britain (and in certain ways the best), the liberal-Left Guardian, ran 40 small photos of some the victims, with the headline, “Killed in the Pitiless Name of Terrorism.”

虽然欧洲的弱点已展露无遗,但这并不意味着我们的脑子就清醒了。在巴黎恐怖袭击发生仅仅三天之后,英国最具影响力的报纸(从某些角度说也是最好的)——左翼自由派的《卫报》,刊登了40张遇害者的小幅照片,而使用的标题则是“以冷酷的恐怖主义之名而遭杀害”。

They were not killed in the pitiless name of terrorism, of course. They were killed in the pitiless name of Islam—not the only possible interpretation if Islam, no doubt, but still in its name. In the cowardice of this headline was the encapsulated all the weakness of Europe, a real encouragement to the terrorists.

当然,他们并非以冷酷的恐怖主义之名而被杀死。他们是以冷酷无情的伊斯兰之名而被杀死——是的,这不是解读伊斯兰的唯一方式,但这些杀戮仍是以伊斯兰之名而行。《卫报》标题中所表现出的懦弱是今天欧洲所有弱点的集中体现,而这对恐怖分子们来说则是一种实实在在的激励。

Muslim zealotry and embittered materialism

Screen Shot 2015-12-06 at 14.39.01Dalrymple writes of Islamic proselytising in prisons:

An outside observer might conclude from the religious literature that he sees there that Britain is more an Islamic than a Christian country.

Prisoners are susceptible to religious conversion, by which, Dalrymple says,

they do not feel that they have simply surrendered unconditionally to society, meekly accepting its law-abiding, middle-class norms after years of flouting them. They do not simply slink away from crime, defeated by the system; they have actively chosen a new life.

A life without boundaries

is a life of torment. It is without form, a void. Islam, with its daily rituals and its list of prohibitions, is ideally suited to those who are seeking to contain their lives.

Mahometanism, Dalrymple points out, has this great advantage:

It is feared by society at large. By adopting Islam, prisoners are killing two birds with one stone: they are giving themselves boundaries so that they can commit no more crimes — of the ordinary kind — and yet do not feel that they have capitulated to the demands of society.

The extent of the secularisation of young Muslim men in prison

can hardly be exaggerated. They do not pray or keep Ramadan, or perform any other religious duties. Like their white and black counterparts, they are interested in sex, drugs and rock ‘n’ roll.

Their difference is that, thanks to their cultural inheritance, their abuse of women

is systematic rather than unsystematic as it is with the whites and blacks. That is the way they intend to keep it, for it is a very gratifying system.

Dalrymple explains that

the match that puts the flame to the combustible mixture is a general sense of grievance and of grave injustice.

By injustice,

they do not mean that they did not do what they were accused of having done. On the contrary, they know perfectly well that, like most other prisoners, they have committed between five and 15 times more crimes than they have been accused of, and celebrate the fact. No, by injustice they mean social injustice.

Their justice, says Dalrymple, is

an ideal state of affairs which includes an effortlessly acquired, endless supply of women and BMWs. Much religious zealotry is disappointed and embittered materialism.

The politico-religious fanaticism

of which we are rightly afraid is not the product of Islam alone, but of an amalgam of Islam with sociological ideas according to which people are victims of structural injustice, of the modern equivalent of djinn, such as institutionalised racism.