Category Archives: racism

The labour of negroes in sugar plantations is enjoyable recreation compared with reading through these volumes

Dalrymple undertakes the dreary, gruelling task so that we don’t have to.

The real opponents of racism

Racism, Dalrymple points out,

is truly opposed not by anti-racists, but by non-racists, that is, people who do not judge or behave towards others according to their race.

The fruits of liberation

Screenshot 2020-02-08 at 08.14.24Dalrymple notes that the first fruit of the liberation of the former Rhodesia was

repeated massacres in Matabeleland.

The second fruit was

to turn a land of immigration into a land of mass emigration, thanks to corruption and idiotic economic policies — without any increase in individual freedom.

Liberation meant

only the replacement of white by black government.

The liberation movement

was fighting for power, not for freedom. The wish for access to power is not the same as the wish that others be free.

The inherent condescension of special funding of black actors

Give me the money!

Institutionalised racial discrimination

Hardly anyone, writes Dalrymple, questions the propriety of allocating funds on the basis of race. He notes that

visitors to the National Theatre or the Royal Shakespeare Company would be surprised to hear that black actors are underrepresented in the theatre, for in those companies’ productions, at least, they seem to be grossly overrepresented, presumably as a result of deliberate policy.

No one notices, either,

the inherent condescension of special funding of black actors and artists in other fields. There are no special funds, for example, for the Chinese, who are presumed able to look after themselves.

More victim than thou

Pocahontas

The one-drop rule

If, writes Dalrymple, Elizabeth Warren could prove that at some time in the past, however distant, one of her ancestors belonged to what the people of Hindustan—the real experts in human classification, having had millennia of practice at it—call the ‘scheduled castes’,

some extra moral authority would be added unto her.

There’s no racist as fanatical as an anti-racist

It demonstrates, Dalrymple says, how racialised liberal thinking—liberal in the US, not in the classical, sense—has remained in America. He observes that

once you start down the road of equality of outcome as the measure of justice, rather than equality under the law, you start dividing humans into groups, and one of the most obvious ways to do so is race. So, having spent years denying that there is any objective reality to racial classifications, liberals start sifting people into racial categories with an obsessiveness that puts South African policemen under the old régime to shame.

Race, among other classifications,

becomes a lens through which the whole of social life is examined.

How to keep blacks at the bottom of the pile

Kendrick Lamar: industrialised vileness

A contorted form of racism

I don’t give a fuck: the best that can be hoped for from a black man

Dalrymple writes that an informant,

who keeps up more closely than do I with developments in the field of cultural vulgarity,

explains that a man called Kendrick Lamar, of whom Dalrymple has never heard, has won a Pulitzer prize for his ‘songs’, and suggests that Dalrymple look up their lyrics. One of the choruses goes:

I don’t give a fuck, I don’t give a fuck,
I don’t give a, I don’t give a, I don’t give a fuck

Another:

If I gotta slap a pussy-ass nigga, I’ma make it look sexy
If I gotta go hard on a bitch, I’ma make it look sexy
I pull out, hop out, air out, make it look sexy
They won’t take me out my element
Nah, take me out of my element

Perhaps this is meant ironically, but

when you listen to the decerebrate rage with which Mr Lamar intones these words, it is not easy to believe it. When I listened to Mr Lamar, I recalled those cats in laboratories whose higher brain centers had been severed, and whose amygdalae were stimulated with electric currents, reacting with insensate rage directed at nothing in particular.

We should not

assume that Mr Lamar’s ‘art’ is sincere, or that it expresses anything other than a lust for fame and money.

Dalrymple notes that

this kind of paramusical product is elaborated and marketed to ensure that blacks in America remain where they are—at the bottom of the pile.

How, asks Dalrymple,

did the horrible and disgusting coarseness that Mr Lamar so proudly exhibits develop? How did evil became good?

The worst aspect is

the cowardly and insincere fawning over Mr Lamar’s industrialised vileness by a cultural establishment. Could any intelligent, educated person find in Mr Lamar anything worthy of praise, emulation, or reward?

One of the judges said in defence of the award:

The challenge for future juries will be to maintain the mission of honouring high standards of excellence in an expanding sphere of music, and there lie both a sizable burden and huge new opportunity.

Dalrymple comments:

Mr Lamar is so good (by good, I mean evil) that it is difficult to conceive of anything better (i.e. worse). Future juries will have difficulty in finding anything more transgressive to award a prize to, thereby proving their open-mindedness to other minds so open, like their own, that they can contain nothing.

Underlying this

is a contorted form of racism: I don’t give a fuck is the best that can be expected or hoped for from a black man.

Exudation of ethnic pride and shame

A Spanish-African-Swiss-Amerindian-Norwegian-Mongolian-Chilean expert on racial issues

Leafing through El País, Dalrymple comes across an unapologetically racist article headed ‘La esperanza de Haití vuela a Chile‘. It is the product of a Swiss-born racial affairs expert of Nordic descent called Carlos Franz.

The article reads in part:

Al igual que otros chilenos soy el orgulloso poseedor de una callana. Esta es una marca congénita de color azulado que aparece sobre la piel del coxis en los recién nacidos con ascendencia indígena o asiática. La callana —también llamada mancha mongólica— suele desaparecer a los dos años. Pero en mi caso aún conservo su sombra en la mitad de mi espalda….Según los genetistas, mi callana, esa marca amerindia cuya sombra llevo orgullosamente en mi espalda, también podría tener orígenes africanos. Mejor aún. Los indígenas y los negros que bailan en mi sangre abrazan a estos nuevos hermanos que llegan a Chile.

Carlos Franz: immensely proud of his Mongolian spot, his Amerindian mark (where precisely on his body this is to be found is not stated), his African origins, and the blood of the oppressed that courses or dances through his veins. There is a shameful Swiss-Norwegian taint to his blood, but it is the merest trace

Dalrymple notes that Franz

welcomes the Haïtians not purely as men, but because they are, or might be, related to him by race. It implies that Amerindians have, as a race, especially warm feelings for people of African descent. I don’t know whether as a sociological generalisation this is true, but if it is true, it would not be by virtue of the blood coursing, or even dancing, through their veins.

Moral complacency

Indeed,

the idea of thoughts or feelings being transmitted hæmotologically has a rather unpleasant historical connotation, of which the author, in his moral complacency, seems unaware.

Franz

places races in a hierarchy, though not the traditional one of intelligence, ranging from inferior to superior, but of victimhood. It is even better to have African descent than Amerindian because Africans have been even worse used than Amerindians and are greater victims. By having black blood coursing through his veins he participates in their victimhood, which conveys upon him the moral authority of a victimised martyr, even though he may have gone to all the best schools, etc.

Humbug

That Franz was born in Geneva and is principally of Norwegian descent is

a matter of shame that besmirches anything that he may have achieved in life, because his achievements must have been the product of privilege, that is to say the privilege borne in his blood.

Dalrymple points out that when Haïti was a French possession,

there was a table of racial descent that included 64 degrees of white purity. That is to say, one black great-great-great-great-grandparent was enough to pollute your blood.

Franz, says Dalrymple,

would agree with this, except that he would assign a different, or opposite, value to the blood that the French would have regarded as polluting. Nor will I repeat the old Southern saying about one drop of blood, a saying with which he would also agree — except that one drop of African blood in his case would wash away all his sins, rather like the waters of the Ganges at Allahabad during the Kumbh Mela.

In praise of Rhodesia

The anti-colonial struggle in Africa, writes Dalrymple,

was not about freedom but about power and loot.

The sense in which it represented a political advance

was that it accorded with people’s natural preference for being ruled by a local rather than a foreign dictator, even if the latter were the better ruler by far. Many of the progressive pieties of the 20th century thus had within them a strong core of xenophobia and racism.

Dalrymple avers that Robert Mugabe

is a fine example of his genre: the liberator-turned-despot.

Compared to that of Mugabe, the régime of Ian Smith was infinitely preferable, being

  • considerably less ruthless
  • more willing to place limits upon its exercise of power
  • administratively vastly more competent

Mugabe, Dalrymple notes,

inherited a flourishing country, despite years of international sanctions, one that even Nyerere (no friend of Smith) called a jewel. Whoever takes over from Mugabe will most certainly not inherit a flourishing country.

Rhodesian whites are characterised by the ignorant as

  • lazy
  • spoilt
  • frivolous
  • anti-intellectual
  • beer-swilling
  • rugby-playing
  • thoroughly exploitative

The destroyers

Yet it is difficult, says Dalrymple,

to see how such a people could have left a bejewelled legacy.

A plague of locusts

Mugabe’s force and fraud

have had the opposite consequence of that of the whites: the bread-basket has become the basket case.

The whites

constructed something worthwhile.

Mugabe and his cronies have been

entirely parasitic.

A spouter of rubbish

screen-shot-2017-03-05-at-12-50-25The noted bodybuilder Asao B. Inoue, editor of Muscle Invasion magazine and professor of writing at the University of Tacoma in the state of Washington in the USA, writes like this:

Antiracist writing assessment ecologies explicitly pay close attention to relationships that make up the ecology, relationships among people, discourses, judgments, artifacts created and circulated. They ask students to reflect upon them, negotiate them, and construct them. Antiracist writing assessment ecologies also self-consciously (re)produce power arrangements in order to examine and perhaps change them. When designing an antiracist writing assessment ecology, a teacher can focus students’ attention on a few of the ecological elements discussed, which inter-are. This means addressing and negotiating one element, say the part of a rubric, means you are addressing others, such as power relations and the ecological places where students problematize their existential writing assessment situations.

Dalrymple comments:

Cicero said that nothing was so foolish that some philosopher had not said it. This is just as well for us journalists, because it gives us such easy targets when we have deadlines to meet and no time to think, which is most of the time. The targets are becoming easier and easier. It is almost unfair, like mowing down a herd of deer with a machine gun. Massacre is not sport.

Not exactly Gibbon

Not exactly Gibbon

Still,

it must be done, or rubbish will rule the day; for the problem with the spouters of rubbish is that they are serious, in intent if not in thought. They want to change the world, and often succeed because at first no one takes them at their word. All that is needed for evil to flourish, Edmund Burke is said to have said, though no one can find where or when exactly, is for good men to do nothing.

Inoue, whom Dalrymple describes as

a deeply conventional corrupter of youth,

has

delivered himself of the pseudo-original opinion that American grammar is inherently racist.

screen-shot-2017-03-05-at-12-58-35Dalrymple writes:

It might be thought that a man like Professor Inoue could do little damage. It is unlikely that ghetto youth will ever go on the rampage shouting Problematize our existential assessment situations! It has other problems on its mind, such as police brutality and the price of crack.

The problem is that Inoue

probably demands of his students that they reproduce his thoughts—or rather, opinions. Professor Inoue is not alone in his disapproval of standard grammar, far from it: Pedagogically, it has become almost an orthodoxy.

The professor goes in for polysyllabic pseudo-ratiocination

The professor goes in for polysyllabic pseudo-ratiocination

Whatever else may be said of this view,

it is certainly socially conservative in its effects, for to discourage impoverished children from learning a standard language is to ensure (unless they become sportsmen or the like) that they remain impoverished for the rest of their lives, not only economically but in intellect. To be intelligent but not to have the tools to be able to use one’s intelligence is a terrible fate, and dangerous.

Absurdity in the modern world, says Dalrymple,

is not just funny (though it is funny); it has harmful effects. Politically correct thinking seems to have insinuated itself into the nooks and crannies of our culture. People who have utterly conventional thoughts by the standards of political correctness think they are daring, and that subversion consists of saying what everyone else (everyone in le tout Paris sense of the word) says.

screen-shot-2017-03-05-at-12-12-27screen-shot-2017-03-05-at-13-02-38

The Cæsaropapists

screen-shot-2016-12-24-at-19-13-36Dalrymple writes that in her speech on the basket of deplorables, Hillary Clinton divided people into

  1. the decent and correct, holding sterilised opinions on race, sex, identity and culture
  2. the deviant and incorrect, dwelling outside the limits of civilised society

La población se halla aquí dividida entre quienes tienen opiniones decentes, correctas, demostrablemente esterilizadas, sobre la raza, el sexo, la identidad nacional y el multiculturalismo, despojadas de todos los agentes contaminantes no autorizados, por un lado, y quienes, al desviarse del punto de vista correcto, se sitúan ellos mismos fuera de los límites aceptables de la sociedad civilizada, por otro.

Bill Clinton: the expression of virtuous opinions has the happy effect of liberating behaviourCorrect opinion, Dalrymple notes, is nine-tenths of virtue. Anyone with wrong opinions is morally wrong: worse than a thief, a delinquent or a drunk, and much worse than a womaniser. Virtue is not the exercise of a discipline but the expression of an opinion; this has the happy effect of liberating behaviour.

La mayoría de los intelectuales consideran ahora, además, que la opinión «correcta» son nueve décimas partes de virtud, por lo que cualquier persona que abrace las opiniones «erróneas» no está simplemente equivocada, sino que es moralmente mala: peor que, por ejemplo, un ladrón, un delincuente o un borracho, y mucho peor que un mujeriego. Actualmente la virtud no es el ejercicio de una disciplina, sino la expresión de una opinión: lo cual tiene, por supuesto, el feliz efecto de liberar la verdadera conducta.

For the Cæsaropapists, as Dalrymple calls them, words like racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic are wonderfully elastic. Such epithets have negative connotations, of course; as to their denotations, well, they denote anything that the powerful, or those aspiring to power, say they denote. The point is not just to exercise power but to entrench it, moulding minds and obviating resistance.

Palabras como racista, sexista, homófobo, xenófobo e islamófobo son maravillosamente elásticas desde el punto de vista del nuevo Cæsaropapista, que desea no sólo ejercer el poder temporal sino también afianzarlo, moldeando las mentes de las personas de tal modo que les resulte imposible cualquier oposición real. Epítetos como los referidos más arriba tienen ahora connotaciones morales irreductiblemente negativas, pero en cuanto a qué es lo que realmente denotan… bueno, denotan cualquier cosa que el poderoso, o el aspirante a poderoso, diga que denotan.

'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.' (Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, Mervyn Peake illustration)

‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’ (Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, Mervyn Peake illustration)

Dalrymple points out that in a world where representations of reality are more important than reality itself, control of the meanings of words is as important as, or more important than, control of parliaments.

En un mundo en el que las representaciones de la realidad son a menudo, o incluso habitualmente, más importantes que la realidad misma, el control de los significados de las palabras resulta tan importante como el control de los parlamentos, o anterior a este.

Take racism. It is, Dalrymple notes, no longer the doctrine that certain groups of people are inferior; it now means opposition to political prescriptions, often extraordinarily bureaucratic and job-multiplying, supposed to counteract racism. A racist is no longer a member of a gang that goes about lynching people, or an advocate of segregation in buses; it is someone who harbours doubts about, say, affirmative action, who apprehends that such a policy leads to falling standards, that it works against those who, having broken through, wonder if their success might not be due to racial condescension. A racist is also someone who denies that the differing levels of achievement of various groups is attributable entirely to injustice — of the kind that it is the duty of the State to correct.

La definición de palabras como racista es importante, porque a nadie, exceptuada una porción diminuta e insignificante de la población, le gusta que le llamen racista. Pero se trata de una acusación contra la que resulta cada vez más difícil defenderse. El racismo ya no significa la doctrina según la cual ciertos grupos de seres humanos físicamente identificables son biológica y moralmente inferiores y pueden, por tanto, ser tratados como tales. Es, más bien, la oposición a algún tipo de prescripción política, con frecuencia extraordinariamente burocrática y creadora de empleo, supuestamente con el propósito de contrarrestar el racismo, que es ahora más del corazón que de la verdadera conducta. El racista ya no es el integrante de una pandilla que se dedica al linchamiento o el defensor de la segregación en los autobuses, sino la persona que duda del acierto de la discriminación positiva porque no sólo conduce a un descenso de los estándares, sino que puede llegar a confundir a un negro que ha logrado abrirse camino y que no sabe si su éxito se debe a una suerte de condescendencia racial y no a su propio talento. Y se trata de una preocupación que ningún éxito ni logro pueden mitigar. Racista es también la persona que niega que las diferencias en el resultado alcanzado entre grupos humanos deben atribuirse entera y exclusivamente a una injusticia que es obligación del gobierno corregir y que asegura que esas diferencias en los resultados podrían haber surgido de otro modo.

screen-shot-2016-12-24-at-19-23-53Dalrymple cites homophobia. It is no longer a wish to outlaw homosexual behaviour; it now applies when, for instance, people raise questions about homosexual marriage, as if such doubts are based on nothing but the most savage hatred. To be homophobic is to be put in the category of a member of a gang that goes around looking for homosexuals to beat up. Even wanting to discuss the matter is ultramontane: to deny the rightness, the good sense, the humanity of homosexual marriage is like believing that the Earth is flat — with this difference, that while the latter is a harmless eccentricity, the former is a moral enormity.

Homofobia no es un deseo de perseguir activamente a los homosexuales declarando ilegal su comportamiento incluso en privado, o atacándoles o humillándoles dondequiera que se encuentren; es, entre otras cosas, cuestionar el acierto del matrimonio homosexual, o plantearle objeciones, como si tal cuestionamiento u objeciones no pudieran sustentarse en nada más racional que la animosidad y los prejuicios más primitivos. Así, a la persona que, por motivos intelectuales, se opone (aun en la privacidad de su propia mente) a que se reconozca el matrimonio entre dos hombres como algo idéntico al celebrado entre un hombre y una mujer, se la colocará en la misma categoría que al integrante de una pandilla que se dedica a ir por las calles en busca de homosexuales para atacarlos. En este sentido, incluso querer examinar el asunto se convirtió en un signo de reacción virulenta o ultramontana, una suerte de tierraplanismo moral. Negar el acierto, el buen sentido o la humanidad del matrimonio homosexual es como persistir en la idea de que la Tierra era plana. Aunque con esta diferencia: que mientras que esto último no es más que una simpática excentricidad, lo primero es una enormidad moral.

screen-shot-2016-12-24-at-19-31-44Few fret enough about the homosexual-marriage issue to risk the shame that dissent from orthodoxy would bring down on them if they protested, says Dalrymple. The issue has been decided by asymmetric warfare between a small number of monomaniacal activists, for whom the matter is of existential importance, and a large number of sceptics and opponents, for whom the matter is just one question among many, and not the most important.

A pocas personas les preocupa el asunto lo bastante como para arriesgarse a sufrir el oprobio moral que haría recaer sobre ellos la pública expresión de disentimiento de la nueva ortodoxia. La cuestión ha sido decidida por el equivalente de la guerra asimétrica entre, por un lado, un número reducido de defensores entusiastas y monomaníacos, para quienes el asunto revestía una importancia existencial, y, por otro, un gran número de escépticos y opositores, para quienes era y es únicamente una cuestión entre muchas otras, y no la más importante.

This de facto silencing of even the mildest sceptical voices is normally associated with totalitarian dictatorships, Dalrymple notes. The self-imposed restriction on expression of heterodox ideas in public soon becomes self-censorship of our ideas, because none of us likes being a coward. The aim is to deny that there has been any suppression of freedom of thought at all.

El silenciamiento de facto de aun el más suave escepticismo ejerce en las mentes el tipo de violencia que normalmente se asocia con las dictaduras totalitarias más que con las democracias liberales. La negativa autoimpuesta a expresar ideas heterodoxas en una compañía «decente» o en público se convierte enseguida en autocensura de las propias ideas, porque a nadie le gusta tenerse por un cobarde; lo que busca, por tanto, es negar antes de nada que se haya producido ningún tipo de supresión.

Thus, on the issue of homosexual marriage, we should not ask

  • how an idea that not so long ago would have seemed absurd, even unthinkable, cannot be questioned by anyone who wishes to be considered enlightened
  • why those who have worked systematically to weaken marriage as an institution, calling it oppressive and stifling of all the potential beauty of human relations, now suddenly exalt it
  • whether this enthusiasm is not, in fact, the means by which to weaken it further
  • what will be next in the boundary-pushing agenda of social engineering

No deben preguntar cómo es que una idea que tan solo pocos años antes habría parecido absurda, ridícula, impensable incluso, se ha convertido en una ortodoxia incuestionable por parte de una persona que desee ser considerada ilustrada; no deben preguntar por qué aquellos que han trabajado sistemáticamente para debilitar el matrimonio como institución, defendiendo que es opresivo e inhibitorio de toda la belleza potencial de las relaciones humanas, lo exaltan ahora de repente de forma entusiasta; no deben preguntarse si este entusiasmo no es, de hecho, el medio con el cual debilitarlo aún más; no deben preguntar si cualquier persona prudente habría de echar por tierra la imagen que tiene de un acuerdo tan antiguo como el matrimonio sin siquiera una mirada retrospectiva; no deben preguntar qué será lo siguiente en la agenda de ingeniería social para acabar con los límites heredados, a pesar de que es perfectamente evidente que la caravana de reformas (como sucedió, de hecho, muy pronto) seguiría adelante. Tampoco deben darse cuenta de que eslóganes como igualdad ante el matrimonio o, en Francia, mariage pour tous, son, bien mentiras, bien pagarés para nuevas «reformas», como el matrimonio incestuoso o la poligamia y la poliandria, ya que, al fin y al cabo, también pueden ser acuerdos realizados entre adultos que consienten en algo (pueden encontrarse adultos que consentirán en casi cualquier cosa, y un ejemplo que viene al caso es el del hombre que quería comerse a alguien y que se emparejó, con éxito desde el punto de vista de la satisfacción del deseo mutuo, con otro que quería ser comido): porque, tras haber negado que el significado del matrimonio es lisa y llanamente la unión de un hombre y una mujer, no existe defensa alguna contra el posterior desplazamiento de los límites.

To stay out of Hillary’s basket, we must suppress thought or, better still, not think. The more important the subject, the more imperative it is to ignore it. It is our duty, if we do not wish to be classed as deplorable, to rejoice in what we regret, to take pleasure in what we have lost, to see in what is strange nothing but the friendly, the compatible, the enriching.

Hay tantos temas sobre los que, a fin de evitar acabar en el cesto, hay que suprimir ahora todo pensamiento o, mejor aún, no pensar, que esta persona se siente oprimida. Cuanto más importante es el tema, más tiene que ignorarlo. Es nuestra obligación, por tanto, si no deseamos que nos clasifiquen como deplorables, alegrarnos de lo que lamentamos, obtener placer de nuestra propia pérdida, no ver en lo extraño más que lo amistoso, compatible y enriquecedor, y concebir en general el mundo sin más como un montón de restaurantes diferentes.

screen-shot-2016-12-24-at-19-36-30Dalrymple instances mass immigration. Are we concerned that too large an influx of people soaked in an alien culture will change our way of life? We must learn to curb this irrationality; we should remember that the way of life to which we are so attached is responsible for all the evils of the world, past, present and future. (This is the mirror image of the mission civilisatrice.)

¿Le preocupa que una llegada demasiado grande de personas empapadas de una cultura extraña cambie un modo de vida al que se siente apegado? Debe aprender a superar su apego: porque, históricamente considerado, el modo de vida al que se siente apegado es responsable de todos los males del mundo, pasados, presentes o futuros. (Esta es, seguramente, la imagen refleja de la mission civilisatrice, y resulta al menos halagadora para nuestro engreimiento.)

Thus, on the issue of Muslim immigration, we are not allowed to ask if it is wise to take in so many people whose faith and conduct

  • do not favour unrestricted intellectual inquiry
  • spring from an uninterrupted tradition of punishing critics, if not eliminating them
  • betray no conception of equality before the law

screen-shot-2016-12-24-at-19-39-19On no account must we ask

  • if it is wise to take in so many people the influence of whose religion, in its most intransigent and evangelising form, looks like it is growing very rapidly
  • what we receive, over and above a wider choice of restaurants and certain talented individuals that can be found in all groups, in return for the grave danger posed by a small minority
  • what benefit these people bestow that is not on offer from other immigrants without the attendant danger

No debe siquiera pasársenos por la cabeza que quizá sea desaconsejable aceptar en nuestro seno a un número demasiado grande de personas cuya religión no favorece la indagación intelectual sin restricciones; que cuenta con una tradición ininterrumpida de castigar a los críticos, cuando no de eliminarlos; que no tiene concepción alguna de la igualdad ante la ley; y cuyo influjo en su forma más intransigente y evangelizadora parece ser hacerse más fuerte en la segunda generación. Nuestra autocensura debe producirse toda ella en nombre de una cualidad abstracta −la diversidad− que se da por supuesto que es buena incondicionalmente y sin reservas. ¿No debemos preguntar qué recibimos específicamente, además de restaurantes y de algunas personas de talento que pueden encontrarse en todos los grupos humanos, a cambio del peligro de plantean ahora una minoría de ellos, hay que admitir que muy pequeña? ¿Cuál es el beneficio que no pueda ser traído por otros grupos inmigrantes sin el peligro anejo?

To allow such thoughts to run through our heads even for a moment is to suffer the deplorable condition of Islamophobia. If we wonder whether Mohammedanism is compatible with intellectual freedom, it is a sign of a moral defect as well as of a psychopathology. We have an irrational fear, like that of spiders or of being locked in a room.

Dejar siquiera que estos pensamientos se te pasen por la cabeza durante un instante es padecer la deplorable condición de islamofobia: como si preguntarse si el islam fuera compatible con la libertad intelectual, especialmente en relación consigo mismo, fuera similar en su forma a un miedo irracional a las arañas o a estar encerrado en una habitación. Esta fobia, sin embargo, es tanto enfermedad como defecto moral (al contrario de la aracnofobia o de, por ejemplo, la adicción a las drogas, que es una pura enfermedad).

Mr Podsnap, from Dickens, Our Mutual Friend

Mr Podsnap, from Dickens, Our Mutual Friend

Political correctness, says Dalrymple, sows in the educated the fear of ostracism, of being an intellectual leper, of being locked up with the deplorables (to prevent the spread of the disease). And it infuriates the large numbers of people who neither subscribe to it nor benefit from it, and who feel that the energies devoted to trying to decide, for instance, which public toilets transsexuals should be allowed to use, is an insult to their own, much more pressing, problems.

Entre las clases educadas, la corrección política siembra el miedo al ostracismo social, a quedar relegados a un leprosario mental en el que se encierra a todos los deplorables para impedir que se propague su maligna enfermedad; pero enfurece a quienes ni la suscriben ni se benefician de ella, y a quienes sienten que la energía y el esfuerzo que se dedican a tratar de decidir qué baños públicos debería permitirse utilizar a los transexuales es un insulto a sus propios problemas, más acuciantes, pero desdeñados.

Moreover, writes Dalrymple, there is in political correctness an insufferable, oppressive, cloying pretension of superiority that needs a Dickens to satirise successfully.

En la corrección política hay una insufrible, agobiante, empalagosa pretensión de superioridad que sólo Dickens podría haber satirizado con éxito.