Category Archives: social security

Wastrel Britishers of Jamaican extraction

These feckless people have had it easy, writes Dalrymple.

Doors were open to them, but they steadfastly refused to walk through them.

Instead they took to the life of what they conceived to be the immemorial Jamaican culture:

  • the getting of bastards
  • the smoking of cannabis
  • the collecting of social security
  • the wearing of gold chains
  • the driving at high speed with music thumping
  • the refusal of work

Chronic fatigue syndrome

What happened when Dalrymple wrote about myalgic encephalomyelitis

Dalrymple explains (from 13:53) that in the condition — or pattern of behaviour — of chronic fatigue syndrome, people suffer

prolonged exhaustion not much relieved by rest and worsened by physical effort.

CFS can last, Dalrymple points out,

for years and indeed for lifetimes, at least where there is a system of social security.

There is dispute over whether the syndrome is of physical or of socio-psychological origin. The people who have CFS

almost always prefer the physical explanation, and their pressure groups have almost succeeded in silencing anyone who argues differently.

Dalrymple once wrote an article on the subject that

admittedly was not emollient in tone.

It ventured to support the psychological or social origin of CFS. The doctor-writer immediately found himself

the object of persecutory telephone calls at all hours, and even attempts to have me sacked from the hospital in which I was working.

The campaign against Dalrymple was highly vigorous, forceful, lively and energetic. For instance, no other Dalrymple article has ever been brought to the attention of a government minister,

but this one was, by people who are normally very tired.

The suicide factory

Perhaps the only surprising thing about the Finsbury Park attack, writes Dalrymple,

is that it took so long to happen.

For six years, the mosque

was the base of the most notorious Moslem cleric in Britain, Abu Hamza, who preached undying hatred of the West (while taking its social security). And although the mosque has reformed since his departure — he is serving a life sentence without parole in the USA — it is associated in the minds of most people in Britain with the kind of Moslem extremism that has led to the recent rash of terrorist attacks in Manchester and London.

Europe’s decay into irrelevance

Screen Shot 2016-08-04 at 22.35.21The auguries for Europe are not good, writes Dalrymple,

not only because of the political immobilism that elaborate systems of social security have caused in most European countries, but because of the European multinational entity that is being created against the wishes of the peoples of Europe.

The European Union serves several purposes, none of which have much to do with the challenges facing the continent. It

  • helps Germans to forget that they are Germans, and gives them another identity rather more pleasing in their estimation
  • allows the French to forget that they are a medium-sized nation, one among many, and gives them the illusion of power and importance
  • acts as a giant pension fund for politicians who are no longer willing or able successfully to compete in the rough-and-tumble of electoral politics, and enables them to hang on to influence and power long after they have been rejected at the polls
  • acts as a fortress against the winds of competition that are blowing from all over the world and that are deeply unsettling to people who desire security above all else

Sex-work and elasticity of demand

Screen Shot 2016-06-25 at 12.21.05In a recent debate, Dalrymple makes the obvious point that elasticity of demand for prostitutes’ services in a fornication market is great or small according as the amount of coitus demanded increases much or little for a given fall in sex-price, and diminishes much or little for a given rise in sex-price.

He asks if prostitution,

being merely one kind of work among others, could rightfully be forced upon unemployed women in receipt of social security, who had not the right to turn down available work in supermarkets, for example. Surely, training could easily be given and certificates handed out. At least at elementary levels, no very prolonged apprenticeship could be required.

Why the West has to import labour

Despicable work, according to the UK newspaper the Guardian

Despicable work, according to the UK newspaper the Guardian

People, especially young people, in the better-off countries of Western Europe very often have completely the wrong attitude to work, if they work. The result, writes Dalrymple, is that,

despite mass unemployment, we have to import labour

in order that certain kinds of work be done. In Ireland, for example, Dalrymple says that

an old lady of my acquaintance needed 24-hour attendance, and this was provided by a Filipina, even at a time when there was 15% unemployment in Ireland.

An important factor is the

system of social security and unemployment benefits. The economic difference between doing this type of work and not working is not great enough to entice any native to do it.

There is also a

psychological, cultural or even religious difference. The change in the title of the senior nurse in a hospital ward from sister to ward manager is indicative of a change in sensibility, from a residually religious notion of serving others to a technocratic one. In the popular imagination, the distinction between service and servitude has been more or less eliminated.

Dalrymple cites a sentence written by a columnist in the London newspaper the Guardian:

So when a girl at 17 decides to go ahead and have a baby, there is no tragedy of lost opportunity other than the local checkout till waiting for her low-paid labour.

Such a sentence, Dalrymple notes,

breathes snobbery and disdain for those who do such work; it assumes that once a checkout cashier, always a checkout cashier, a fate worse than death. That there might be people for whom such work is suitable and potentially not odious does not occur to the writer. What makes the work odious is not the work but those who communicate their disdain of it. Snobbery thus makes the import of labour necessary.

Take hotels. In Britain, Dalrymple points out,

all good hotels employ exclusively foreign labour. If you want to go to a really bad large hotel in Britain, find one in which the staff are British. It is guaranteed to be ill-kept, with slovenly service, not very clean, with atrocious food, grubby staff, inattention to detail. Even a foreign telephonist is likely to be better, and to speak better English, than an English telephonist. If you want a good or even only a decent hotel, you must find one in which all the staff are foreign. This is so whatever the unemployment rate, high or low.

Dalrymple says he asks people to imagine that they are employers who seek an employee to perform work that is not skilled but requires such characteristics as punctuality, politeness, willingness to oblige.

The imagined employer has two applicants about whom he knows only two things: their age (shall we say 24) and their nationality. One is British and one is Polish. Which of the applicants does the imagined employer choose? Not a single person to whom I have put this question has hesitated for a moment: he chooses the Pole.

Our need for migrants

has a cultural, not an economic root.

But of course,

this does not mean that we need all the migrants we are likely to get from wherever we get them.

The State dare not take on Molenbeek

Tax-exempt

Tax haven

Dalrymple writes that on his visit to Molenbeek, the Islamist quarter of Brussels,

I could see the dangers clearly enough.

People like Salah Abdeslam, the Moslem fundamentalist terrorist,

would swim like a fish in the sea there, to use a Maoist metaphor. Between the sympathetic locals and the rest of the population—whom they could intimidate into silence—it would be easy to hide.

This social world

is impenetrable to the forces of the State.

The Belgian government

is unable to collect taxes from businesses there, though it is able to distribute social security.

We’re doomed

Screen Shot 2016-02-24 at 08.32.34The 20th century, writes Dalrymple, was Europe’s

melancholy, long withdrawing roar, and just as Great Britain would not long be suffered to be the workshop of the world, so the world did not long suffer the continent of Europe to dominate it, economically, culturally and intellectually. Europe’s loss of power, influence and importance continues; and however much one’s material circumstances may have improved, it is always unpleasant, and creates a sense of existential unease, to live in a country perpetually in decline, even if that decline is relative.

Combined with this, he points out, is the fact that most European populations

experience a feeling of impotence in the face of their immovable political élites. This feeling is not because of any lack of intelligence or astuteness on the part of the populations: if you wanted to know why there was so much youth unemployment in France, you would not ask the prime minister but the more honest and clear-headed village plumber or carpenter, who would give you many precise and convincing reasons why no employer in his right mind would readily take on a new and previously untried young employee. Indeed, it would take a certain kind of intelligence, available only to those who have undergone a lot of formal education, not to be able to work it out.

The motor of Europe’s decline, says Dalrymple, is

its obsession with social security, which has created rigid social and economic systems that are resistant to change.

An open economy

holds out more threat to Europeans than promise: they believe that the outside world will bring them not trade and wealth, but unemployment and a loss of comfort. They are inclined to retire into their shell and succumb to protectionist temptation, internally with regard to the job market and externally with regard to other nations. The more those other nations advance, the more necessary does protection seem to them.

The State

is either granted or arrogates to itself ever greater powers. A bureaucratic monster is created that is not only uneconomic but anti-economic and that can be reformed only at the cost of social unrest that politicians wish to avoid. Inertia intermittently punctuated by explosion is the outcome.

Dalrymple notes that the British government

has increased public expenditure enormously, such that the British tax burden exceeds that of Germany, which is a heavily taxed economy. The ostensible purpose has been to improve public services while serving the cause of social justice, a rhetoric that the public has hitherto believed; the hidden purpose has been to create administrative jobs on an unprecedented scale, whose function consists of obstruction of other people as they try to create wealth, and to bring into being a clientèle dependent upon government largesse (half the British population is in receipt of government subventions as part or the whole of their incomes) and results in an ‘keep a-hold of nurse for fear of something worse’ psychology.

The dependent population

does not like the state and its agents, indeed they hate them, but they come to fear the elimination of their good offices more. They are like drug addicts who know that the drug that they take is not good for them, and hate the drug dealer, but cannot face the supposed pains of withdrawal.

In the name of social justice,

personal and sectional interest has become all-powerful, paralysing attempts to maximise collective endeavour. The goal of everyone is to parasitise everyone else, or to struggle for as large a slice of the cake as possible. No one worries about the size of the cake. Après nous le déluge has become the watchword of the population.

It hardly needs pointing out that

the rest of an increasingly competitive and globalised world is not going to be sensitive to the same concerns as European governments.

The miserabilist view of the European past,

in which achievement is disregarded in favour of massacre, oppression and injustice, deprives the population of any sense of pride or tradition to which it might contribute or which might be worth preserving. This loss of cultural confidence is important at a time of mass immigration from very alien cultures, an immigration that can be successfully negotiated (as it has been in the past, or in the USA up to the era of multiculturalism) only if the host nations believe themselves to be the bearers of cultures into which immigrants wish, or ought to wish, to integrate, assimilate, and make their own.

In the absence of any such belief,

the only way in which people inhabiting a country will have anything in common is geographical; and civil conflict is the method in which they will resolve their very different and entrenched conceptions about the way life should be lived. This is particularly true when immigrants believe they are in possession of a supposedly unique and universal truth, such as Islam. And if the host nation is so lacking in cultural confidence that it does not even make familiarity with the national language a condition of citizenship, it is hardly surprising that integration does not proceed.

The problem is multiplied when a rigid labour market

creates large castes of people who are unemployed and might well remain so for the whole of their adult lives. The bitterness caused by economic uselessness is multiplied by the bitterness of cultural separation. In the case of Islam this is dangerous, because the mixture of an awareness of inferiority on the one hand, and superiority on the other, is a combustible one. Latin Americans have felt it towards the USA, Russians towards Western Europe, Chinese and Japanese towards Europe and America.

The auguries are not good,

not only because of the political immobilism that elaborate systems of social security have caused in most European countries, but because of the European multinational entity that is being created against the wishes of the peoples of Europe.

The European Union serves several purposes, none of which have much to do with the challenges facing the continent. It

  • helps Germans to forget that they are Germans, and gives them another identity rather more pleasing in their estimation
  • allows the French to forget that they are a medium-sized nation, one among many, and gives them the illusion of power and importance
  • acts as a giant pension fund for politicians who are no longer willing or able successfully to compete in the rough-and-tumble of electoral politics, and enables them to hang on to influence and power long after they have been rejected at the polls
  • acts as a fortress against the winds of competition that are blowing from all over the world and that are deeply unsettling to people who desire security above all else

Why do you hate me? I’ve never helped you

Screen Shot 2016-02-07 at 13.13.20Dalrymple is reminded of the old Hindustan proverb when a patient makes a claim against him (later thrown out by the court as vexatious).

I had, from kindness, prepared a medical report for him free of charge, only to be presented by him with a claim of $375,000 for negligence a few months later.

The proverb might also be understood by some Swedes. Dalrymple writes:

Not without a certain moral grandiosity, and probably from a sense of guilt at its good fortune, Sweden—or at least its political élite and its large social-democratic middle class—decided to start accepting refugees from countries such as Iraq and Somalia, beginning in the 1990s. A gulf soon opened between the pays légal and the pays réel. Officially, all was welcoming, generous, and equal; in reality, urban ghettoes were springing up, with all their attendant problems.

Perhaps Sweden

has been generous towards its newcomers; by most European standards, the unemployment rate among the children of immigrants is low, though it is twice that of the general population and reaches 40 percent in some places.

But

generosity does not necessarily produce gratitude,

and some youths of the housing projects turned to

looting and burning the People’s Home, as the Swedes like to call their country.

There has been much rioting in recent years, greeted in the rest of Europe with a certain quiet satisfaction.

No one likes to have a moral exemplar held up constantly before him, and the riots suggested that the exemplar was not so exemplary.

Dalrymple points out, inter alia, that subsidies and spending on social programmes

have made it possible for many immigrants to avoid integrating or learning Swedish. The combination of social security and vast cultural difference is dangerous.

Ghettoised Sweden

Screen Shot 2015-11-26 at 09.06.25Dalrymple points out that last year, Sweden took in 100,000 migrants and this year it is estimated that it will have taken in 190,000, equivalent to 3 per cent of the population. He says:

If this rate were to continue for very long, Sweden would be irreversibly changed for ever.

On the London Guardian newspaper’s website, Dalrymple comes across a video about the Sverigedemokraterna or Sweden Democrats, a political party opposed to mass immigration. Dalrymple writes:

The Guardian journalist interviewed young members and made them appear arrogant and unattractive. Whether this was the result of editing or a true representation of them, or both, I cannot say. She herself appeared intolerably smug and self-righteous, arrogant in a different way. She asked the young Swedes what was wrong with vibrant multicultural societies such as Britain and France.

Even from the video,

what was shown, no doubt unintentionally, was that Sweden was not multicultural, it was ghettoised, with practically no contact whatever between the refugees and natives.

The Swedes, says Dalrymple,

throw social security to the refugees as zookeepers throw meat to the lions.

One of the questions of the Guardian journalist to the young Swedes was

Why do you dress so smartly?

The question was asked, says Dalrymple,

in an accusatory tone, as if dressing smartly was yet another of their bad qualities, a derogation of their duty to appear casually or scruffily dressed like almost everyone else in modern society.

For the person who asked it,

any kind of formality in dress was symbolic of élitist or exclusivist political sympathies, whereas casual dress, the prevailing any-old-howism of the majority of the population, was symbolic of democratic and egalitarian sympathies, a demonstration of solidarity with the poor of the world. Whether poor people in Africa actually benefit from rich people dressing in expensively-torn jeans and T-shirts is not important: as with presents, it is the thought that counts.

There is another way of looking at it, Dalrymple says.

To dress well is a sign of respect for other people and society, to dress scruffily is a sign of disrespect for them, a sign of the purest egoism. Perhaps it is even possible to express élitism and respect at the same time.