The greatest judge since Pontius Pilate

Dalrymple writes that

for those neither famous nor in a position to ignore their economic interests, and who do not wish to be martyrs to an outcry by the canting Twitterers, fear of repercussion has entered into anything that they say about an increasing number of subjects. Even conversations in private are constrained, due to fear of denunciation. As the Soviets and the Nazis found, private denunciation was one of the pleasures of totalitarianism.

He relates that a 73-year-old part-time lecturer in engineering at Solent University in Southampton

had a conversation with a colleague: a private conversation that led to his dismissal, subsequently upheld by a cowardly minor judge.

Stephen Lamonby had met his superior, Janet Bonar, in the university cafeteria.

During their discussion, he said that Jews were the cleverest people in the world, though they were much maligned for it, and that Germans were good at engineering, which he ascribed to their being part of a society that had long valued and promoted engineering. Bonar was so offended by what he said, even though it was not in a public forum, that, according to Lamonby, she started to shout. In an act worthy of the NKVD, she subsequently reported him to the authorities.

In the university hearing into the matter, Dalrymple reports, the deputy vice-chancellor, Julie Hall, said that Lamonby did not understand that what he had said was offensive, and he was dismissed for ‘gross misconduct’ — gross, mark you, not minor. Bonar said that she was ‘concerned’ about students being taught by someone with his ‘entrenched racist views’. It was not alleged that he was incompetent in his teaching, nor that he was anti-Semitic: he was not one of those conspiracy theorists who will grant that the Jews are clever but use their cleverness to take over the world.

Later, in turning down Lamonby’s appeal, the judge, C.H. O’Rourke, said:

For the avoidance of doubt, I find that it is at least potentially racist to group nationalities, races, ethnic or religious groups, by entire categories and to ascribe certain abilities or talents (or the opposite) to them, when, of course, as with any such group, talents or abilities will vary widely from individual to individual.

He rejected Lamonby’s argument that he was employing a positive stereotype.

With an astonishing lack of logic or attention to the meanings of words, the judge ruled that a Jewish physicist might take offence at his success being ascribed to the fact that he was Jewish rather than to his individual ability or hard work. But since being Jewish and working hard are not mutually exclusive — eminence in most fields is inconceivable without hard work, such that Mozart, a genius if ever there was one, worked and studied extremely hard — no one worth worrying about would ascribe brilliance in physics simply to the fact of being Jewish.

The judge said that the positive stereotype — he did not deny that it was positive —was nevertheless

potentially offensive to the recipient.

Dalrymple notes here the use, for the second time, of the word ‘potentially’ in what the judge said in finding that Lamonby was rightly dismissed. He comments:

Potentially, this use of the word ‘potentially’ could usher in full-blown totalitarianism, for it implies no requirement for any harm to have been caused by a person for him to be punished but only the potential for him to have caused harm. As Kafka put it, ‘Someone must have traduced Josef K., for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one fine morning.’

And what is the harm that Lamonby potentially caused, in the judge’s opinion?

In addition to any offence to Jews, non-Jews might be offended, even ‘grossly’ offended, because they might feel that some characteristic — presumably undesirable, though the judge didn’t specify what — was being ascribed to them.

Eggshell theory

The judge, says Dalrymple, was enunciating

the eggshell theory of the human psyche. If someone takes offence against something someone says, that is sufficient to be a justiciable harm. Gone is the ‘reasonable man’ of traditional English jurisprudence, in assessing whether behaviour is threatening or so insulting as to constitute mitigation for a loss of temper: one is threatened, bullied, insulted, offended if one says that one is, and that is enough to be actionable at law. Feelings become legislators.

In his final sally against freedom of speech, the judge said of Lamonby’s views that anyone might be offended because he spoke about things that

were none of his business.

Dalrymple comments:

If people were to be denied employment for saying something that was none of their business, the world unemployment rate would be close to 100%, except perhaps in North Korea. Nor did the judge make any distinction between what is said in public and what in private.

In a world ruled by the judge,

no generalisations about people would be possible, not even such as, say, that the Dutch are the tallest people in the world. To him, it is irrelevant whether such generalisations are true. That Jews are clever, for whatever reason, seems to be borne out by the disproportionate number of Nobel prizes they win. That Germans are good at engineering seems to be borne out by their cars, machine tools, and other products requiring engineering skill. But mere facts, however obvious, must not interfere with the expression of the right sentiments and the suppression of the wrong ones.

The woman who informed on Lamonby, the vice-chancellor of the university, the employment tribunal that said that the university had a duty to its multicultural student body to ‘protect it from potential acts of racism’, and the judge who rejected Lamonby’s appeal

all had substituted cant for thought.

Dalrymple speculates on why. He thinks the answer might be found

in a word: racism. They were furious with Lamonby because, if what he said were true (for whatever reason) — that Jews were clever and that Germans were good at engineering — it must be true also that other people were less clever and less good at engineering, an impermissible thought. Why impermissible? Because, in their heart of hearts, they fear the possible explanations of inequality of outcome. That is why they do not want a society with no legal impediments to anyone, where everyone is left to find his own level.